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Abstract
We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to individual learning in
economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and other applications.
More precisely, we study the asymptotic properties of a class of stochastic sequences that take values
in [0, 1] and satisfy a property called “bounded expected relative hazard rates.” Sequences that satisfy
this property and feature “small step-size” or “shrinking step-size” converge to 1 with high probability
or almost surely, respectively. These convergence results yield conditions for the learning models in
Erev and Roth (1998), Schlag (1998), and Bo¨rgers et al. (2004) to choose expected payoff maximizing
actions with probability one in the long run.
Keywords: Hazard rate, individual learning, social learning, two-armed bandit algorithm, dynamic
system, stochastic approximation, submartingale, convergence.
1 Introduction
Stochastic sequences arising in the analysis of several models in economics often exhibit expected hazard
rates that are proportional to the sequence’s current value. For instance, models of technology adoption
often satisfy that the change in the fraction of a population that adopts a new technology is propor-
tional to the product of the current fraction of adopters and the current fraction of non-adopters (see,
e.g., Young (2009)). This follows from the assumption that diffusion of technology requires non-adopters
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to observe adopters in order to learn about the new technology. A similar reasoning applies to mod-
els in other disciplines, such as Bass’ celebrated model of new product growth (see, e.g., Bass (1969),
Jackson and Yariv (2011)) and selection models in biological evolution (see, e.g., Nowak (2006)). As we
discuss below, models of individual and social learning provide another class of examples for stochastic
sequences with expected hazard rates that are proportional to the sequences’ current value. In these
models, the sequences represent the probability of choosing optimal actions.
The analysis of such models usually concerns the question whether a new technology or a product gets
fully adopted, a certain type takes over in a biological selection process, or an optimal action is played
almost surely in the long run. Towards this end, this paper provides general conditions on expected
hazard rates of a bounded stochastic sequence that guarantee the convergence to the upper bound. Here,
the sequence is interpreted as a fraction of a certain type or the probability of playing an optimal action at
any point in time. This paper thus provides conditions that guarantee that, in the long run, a certain type
takes over the whole group of types or only optimal actions are chosen, as illustrated in the applications
discussed below.
It turns out that constraints on the relative hazard rates of a stochastic sequence, i.e., the proportions
of the hazard rates to the values of the sequence,1 provide helpful conditions for the convergence to the
upper bound. In contrast to the deterministic case, in a stochastic framework, lower bounds for the
relative hazard rates are not sufficient for almost sure convergence. For example, in the case of technology
adoption, full adoption might fail as the new technology may be completely abandoned at some point in
time by chance, or adoption rates may drop too fast. The analysis below reveals that if the underlying
submartingale moves in small or shrinking steps, convergence to the upper bound holds, nevertheless.
Thus, in the long run, new technologies are used or optimal actions chosen if adoption or learning occurs
in small or shrinking steps.
The first main result of this paper, Theorem 2.1, analyzes the asymptotical properties of a sequence
that changes with small step-size and satisfies weak bounds on its relative hazard rates. Theorem 2.1
asserts that the probability of convergence to optimality, i.e., the event that the stochastic sequence
converges to the upper bound, is arbitrarily high for sequences with sufficiently small step-size. This
result allows us to obtain novel convergence results in different contexts, including, for instance, the
models of individual and social learning that we discuss below. A limitation of Theorem 2.1 is that the
question of how small the step-size needs to be in order to achieve any given probability of convergence to 1
is usually directly related to the probability measure of the underlying probability space. In applications,
however, this probability measure is assumed to be unknown. This issue is addressed by Theorem 2.2 and
Corollary 2.1, which provide sufficient conditions for achieving convergence to optimality almost surely
1Formally, if the values of the sequence are denoted by {Pt}t∈N0 , then the corresponding relative hazard rates are defined
as (Pt+1 − Pt)/((1− Pt)Pt) for all t ∈ N0.
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under an extra condition that may be interpreted as requiring an arbitrary shrinking step-size over time.
These results can be applied to the analysis of several models of boundedly rational learning (see, e.g.,
Erev and Roth (1998), Schlag (1998), Bo¨rgers et al. (2004)). In models of individual learning, in every
period individuals choose one action out of a finite set and observe a payoff realization yielded by the
action they choose (sometimes along with forgone payoffs). In models of social learning, individuals also
observe the payoffs from the actions chosen by a sample of other individuals. Learning is assumed to
be “adaptive,” i.e., in every period, individuals make their choice according to a probability distribution
over actions and this distribution is revised as new payoff observations arrive. As discussed in Section 3,
our results can be used to provide conditions for learning to yield convergence to choose expected-payoff
maximizing actions, either with high probability or almost surely. All details are provided in the online
appendix (Oyarzun and Ruf (2014)).
Small and shrinking step-size appear often in applications. Small step-size has been used in both
theoretical and experimental work in economics (see, e.g., Bo¨rgers and Sarin (1997) and Van Huyck et al.
(2007), respectively). Shrinking step-size appears endogenously in the Roth-Erev model (see, e.g., Erev and Roth
(1998)).2 Researchers using the Cross (1973) model in applications often assume shrinking step-size (see,
e.g., Sarin and Vahid (2004)), even though the benchmark version of this model has a fixed step-size. The
condition of shrinking step-size captures the “power law of practice” in learning (see, e.g., Erev and Roth
(1998) and the references therein): initial periods typically exhibit a substantial response of behavior
to experience and are followed by gradually decreasing responses, such as those implied by shrinking
step-size.
The question then arises when and why the “power law of practice” is relevant. Psychologists have
long studied this problem. For instance, Bills (1934) and Newell and Rosenbloom (1981) study the de-
crease over time of motivation, psychophysical performance, or cognitive gains from experience, as possible
explanations of the “power law of practice.” These explanations have appeal in the analysis of economic
applications, as well. In particular, motivation, psychophysical performance, and cognitive gains play an
important role in the analysis of data in experimental economics, where subjects tire and lose concen-
tration. More importantly, in real-world economic problems, the “power law of practice” seems to hold
for similar reasons. For instance, Choi et al. (2009) analyze reinforcement learning and saving behavior,
and provide evidence supporting the “power law of practice” hypothesis: younger investors are more
responsive to their personal return realizations than older investors in terms of their 401(k) saving rates.
We believe the “power law of practice” plays a role in individual and social learning in economics.
2Polya-urn-based schemes, akin to the Roth-Erev learning model (and hence yielding decreasing step-size), are useful to
study different allocation problems. For instance, Durham et al. (1998) and Laruelle and Pages (2013) apply these models
to the study of patient allocation in clinical trials.
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Related literature. Norman (1968) formally analyzes a two-armed bandit algorithm to study the
asymptotic properties of reinforcement learning models considered by experimental psychologists (see,
e.g., Weinstock et al. (1965)) who study learning when success or failure are the only possible outcomes.
In this pioneering work, he shows that certain learning models converge with high probability to choose
the action that is more likely to yield success, provided that changes in the probability of choosing each
action are small. Computer scientists (see, e.g., Shapiro and Narendra (1969), Narendra and Thathachar
(1974), Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976), and Torkestani and Meybodi (2009)), provide similar
results in the context of learning automata. Oyarzun and Sarin (2013) adapt these techniques to prove
convergence of a class of learning models to risk averse choice. The settings in these papers are more
restrictive than in this work, and their convergence results are implied by Theorem 2.1 below. None of
these papers has a counterpart to the almost-sure convergence results in Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.1
below, as the models they analyze fail to satisfy our conditions on shrinking step-size over time.
The paper closest to our analysis is that of Lamberton et al. (2004), who thoroughly analyze the
asymptotical properties of the two-armed bandit algorithm. This analysis is of particular interest because
the algorithm may have a positive probability of converging to a non-optimal state, i.e., a “trap,” despite
of the probability of choosing an optimal action being a submartingale. Lamberton et al. (2004) take
an approach similar to ours based on shrinking step-size to provide conditions that yield convergence to
optimality almost surely. Their analysis is tailored to the specific characteristics of the two-armed bandit
algorithm, whereas this paper’s framework allows us to apply its results in more general settings such as
the models in economics that we study in the applications.
2 Convergence for updating rules with small and shrinking step-size
2.1 Framework
In this subsection, we provide the analytical framework and introduce the condition of bounded expected
relative hazard rates.
In our applications to models of individual and social learning, the realization of the state of the world
in each period determines the action chosen by each individual, the obtained and forgone payoffs, and
the information revealed to each individual. After observing this information, individuals adjust their
behavior, i.e., the probability of choosing each action according to their behavioral rule. We now provide
a formal model that encompass these models. First, we introduce the probability space and the states
of the world. Then we introduce the updating rule, which is a function that maps the observable part of
the state of the world to the current value of a stochastic process. This process represents performance,
i.e., the probability of choosing optimal actions. The applications discussed in Section 3 illustrate that (a
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slight generalization of) this setup is broad enough to accommodate an array of models of learning.
(a) Probability space. The possible states of the world are represented by the measurable product
space (Ω,F) = (
∏∞
t=1 Ωt,⊗
∞
t=1Ft), where Ωt stands for the set of states that may occur at time t ∈ N
and is equipped with a sigma algebra F t, describing the set of events. Furthermore, let Ω[0,t] :=
∏t
τ=1 Ωτ
denote the set of all histories up to time t and let Ω[0,0] be an arbitrary singleton. Analogously, let
F[0,t] := ⊗
t
τ=1Fτ denote the set of all events that may occur up to time t ∈ N and set F[0,0] := {∅,Ω}. Let
P be a probability measure on (Ω,F), and Pt its conditional version given F[0,t], along with its conditional
expectation Et[·].
(b) Updating rule. An updating rule is a sequence Π = {Πt}t∈N of functions Πt : Ω× [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
such that Πt(·, p) is F[0,t]–measurable for all t ∈ N and p ∈ [0, 1]. We shall usually omit the first argument
of Πt, for sake of notation. For a given P0 ∈ [0, 1], the sequence P = {Pt}t∈N0 , defined via the iteration
Pt = Πt(Pt−1) for all t ∈ N, is called the performance measure (corresponding to the initial value P0 and
the updating rule Π).
The performance measure changes in a probabilistic way over time, according to the information
that becomes available and to the updating rule. Since the updating rule is allowed to depend on all
information revealed up to that period, the performance measure may depend on the whole sequence of
realized states up to that date.
In order to get an intuitive idea of the class of sequences studied in this paper, let us recall the
interpretation borrowed from the literature on technology adoption mentioned in the introduction. Let
Pt ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of a continuum population that has adopted a new technology by time
t ∈ N0. The change in the fraction of the population that adopts the new technology is then assumed to
be proportional to the rate at which a non-adopter observes an adopter. More precisely, if each individual
observes only one other individual, uniformly picked from the population, then the fraction of time t non-
adopters who observe time t adopters is Pt (1− Pt). Only a fraction of these non-adopters are assumed
to adopt the new technology at time t+ 1. In the spirit of survival theory, Young (2009) calls the ratio
(Pt+1 − Pt) / (Pt (1− Pt)) the relative hazard rate of P at time t ∈ N0.
The relative hazard rates of the models studied below are allowed to be stochastic. This paper provides
conditions on the expected values of the relative hazard rates that guarantee that P converges to 1 (with
a high probability or almost surely). Towards this end, we next introduce an important property for
expected relative hazard rates:
Definition 2.1. An updating rule Π satisfies the weakly bounded expected relative hazard rates property
(WBERHR) with lower bound sequence δ := {δt}t∈N0 , where δt ≥ 0 is F[0,t]–measurable, if
Et[Πt+1 (p)]− p ≥ δt · p (1− p) (2.1)
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for all p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ N0. The updating rule Π satisfies the bounded expected relative hazard rates prop-
erty (BERHR) if it satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ := {δt}t∈N0 such that inft∈N0{δt} > 0.
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The nature of phenomena that yield sequences satisfying BERHR or WBERHR is diverse. These
conditions often hold in learning models, such as those discussed in Section 3. They also arise in biological
evolution models (see, e.g., Nowak (2006)), where the variable of interest may be the relative size of the
population of a certain type of cells with respect to the whole population.4
The two-armed bandit algorithm in Lamberton et al. (2004) satisfies WBERHR. The analysis in this
paper, however, requires a more general setup than theirs in order to accommodate the applications below.
For instance, if the two-armed bandit algorithm is modified to allow that the outcomes of both arms are
observed (while perhaps some past outcomes are forgotten), then the results in Lamberton et al. (2004)
do not directly apply. In contrast, in the example of learning with full information that we analyze in
Section ?? of the online appendix, we illustrate how to use the results provided here in that setup.
(c) Convergence to optimality. If the updating rule Π satisfies BERHR or WBERHR, then
the corresponding performance measure P is a bounded submartingale and hence, there exists (almost
surely) the random variable P∞ = limt↑∞ Pt. We call the event {P∞ = 1} convergence to optimality. The
notion of almost sure convergence to optimality also appears as “infallibility” in the literature (see, e.g.,
Lamberton et al. (2004)).
We conclude this subsection with a relatively standard observation (see, e.g., Norman (1968)):
Lemma 2.1. If the updating rule Π satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δt}t∈N0 and if∑∞
t=0 δt =∞, then P∞ ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof. Assume that {Pt}t∈N0 does not almost surely converge to either 0 or 1. Then, there exists an
ε > 0 such that P(limt↑∞ Pt(1 − Pt) > 2ε) > 2ε. Thus, there exists a t0 ∈ N such that the event
B := {Pt(1− Pt) > ε for all t ≥ t0} satisfies P(B) > ε.
By the hypothesis,
Et[Pt+1]− Pt ≥ δtPt(1− Pt)
for all t ∈ N0; thus,
1 ≥ E[Pt] = P0 +
t−1∑
τ=0
E [Pτ+1 − Pτ ] ≥
t−1∑
τ=0
E [δτPτ (1− Pτ )] ≥
t−1∑
τ=t0
E [1BδτPτ (1− Pτ )] ↑ ∞,
3We emphasize that the BERHR property does not require that inft∈N0{δt} is uniformly (in ω ∈ Ω) bounded away from
zero.
4Consider the populations of two types of cells, whose sizes at time t ∈ N0 are Xt and Yt and whose exogenously given
growth rates are a ≥ −1 and b ≥ −1. Thus Xt+1 −Xt = aXt and Yt+1 − Yt = bYt. If a > b, then the fraction of the first
type of cells in the population Pt := Xt/(Xt+Yt) satisfies BERHR: (Pt+1−Pt)/(Pt(1−Pt)) ≥ (a− b)/ (1 + a). In this case,
since Pt is deterministic, standard arguments yield that limt↑∞ Pt = 1.
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as t tends to infinity, leading to a contradiction.
2.2 Example for the lack of almost sure convergence to optimality
The following example, adapted from Viswanathan and Narendra (1972), illustrates that even updating
rules that satisfy a strong version of BERHR, so that the lower bound sequence is uniformly (in ω ∈ Ω)
bounded away from zero, and that have a performance sequence P that never gets absorbed, i.e., Pt ∈ (0, 1)
for all t ∈ N0, may not achieve convergence to optimality almost surely. Consider a two-armed bandit
algorithm that, at each time t, chooses one out of two arms and observes the realization of a failure or
success. Arm 1 and arm 2 succeed with probability µ1 and µ2, respectively, where 0 < µ1 < µ2 < 1. The
probability of choosing arm 1 at time t is 1− Pt and the probability of choosing arm 2 is Pt. If at time t
the observed realization is a failure, then Pt+1 = Pt. Observed successes, however, increase the probability
of choosing the same arm in the next period: if arm 2 is chosen at time t and a success is observed, then
Pt+1−Pt = (1−Pt)(1−β); and, if arm 1 is chosen and a success is observed, then Pt+1−Pt = −Pt(1−β),
for some exogenously given constant β ∈ [0, 1).5 Although the underlying updating rule verifies BERHR
with constant lower bound (1−β)(µ2−µ1) > 0, it is argued below that, with strictly positive probability,
arm 1 is chosen at all times. Therefore, the event {P∞ = 0} has positive probability.
To see how convergence to choose arm 2 may fail, observe that if β = 0, then P1 = 0 with probability
(1 − P0)µ1. Thus, in this case, P(P∞ = 0) ≥ (1 − P0)µ1. If β ∈ (0, 1), partition the set of time periods
in subsets or blocks of consecutive time periods, with cardinalities 1, 2, 3, ..., i.e., {1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, ....
Now, fix j > 1 and consider the event in which arm 1 is chosen at all times until the last time of the
(j − 1)th block, with at least one success in each block. Conditional on that event, the probability of
choosing arm 1 at all times in the block of length j is at least (1−βj−1P0)
j . Furthermore, the probability
of obtaining at least one success in the jth block, given that arm 1 is chosen in all time periods in that
block, is 1 − (1 − µ1)
j. Therefore, the probability that arm 1 is chosen at all times until the last time
period of the N th block, and that at least one success occurs in each block is at least
N∏
j=1
(1− βj−1P0)
j ·
N∏
j=1
(1− (1− µ1)
j). (2.2)
We now argue that the limit of the expression in (2.2), as N tends to ∞, is strictly positive, which,
directly yields P(P∞ = 0) > 0. Since
∑∞
j=1 (1− µ1)
j < ∞, we have
∏∞
j=1(1 − (1 − µ1)
j) > 0.6 Finally,
the inequalities (1 − βj−1P0)
j ≥ 1 − jβj−1P0 > 0 for all large enough j imply that the first product in
(2.2) converges to a strictly positive number since
∑∞
j=1 jβ
j−1 <∞ by the ratio test.
5Equivalently, if arm 1 is chosen and a success is observed, then Pt+1 = βPt.
6We use that, for aj < 1, the product
∏∞
j=1(1− aj) converges to a strictly positive number if the sum
∑∞
j=1 aj converges
absolutely, which follows from taking logarithms and the limit comparison test.
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Intuitively, when an action is chosen initially and sufficient successes are observed, there is a positive
probability that this action is always chosen. However, Corollary 2.1 below reveals that this event would
not occur if the updating rule had decreasing step-size. In this example, such an updating rule is obtained
by replacing (1− β) with (1− β)/(t+ 2) when updating Pt to Pt+1 for all t ∈ N0. Theorem 2.1 yields an
analog statement.
As this example illustrates, the BERHR property does not guarantee convergence to optimality al-
most surely. This paper is mainly concerned with strengthening this property to obtain convergence to
optimality with high probability or almost surely.
2.3 Convergence results
In this subsection, we analyze the asymptotic properties of the performance measure of updating rules
that satisfy either BERHR or WBERHR. In particular, we provide sufficient conditions for updating
rules that satisfy these properties with shrinking step-size, in a sense that we make precise below, to yield
convergence to optimality almost surely.
Towards this end, we fix an updating rule Π and a sequence θ := {θt}t∈N0 such that θt ∈ (0, 1] is F[0,t]–
measurable, which we call a compressing sequence. We now consider the updating rule Πθ =
{
Πθt
}
t∈N
given by the sequence of functions Πθt : Ω× [0, 1]→ [0, 1] that satisfy
Πθt (·, p) := p+ θt−1 (Πt (·, p)− p) (2.3)
for all p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ N.
We say that the updating rule Πθ is a small step-size version of Π. Let P θ =
{
P θt
}
t∈N0
be the
corresponding small step-size version of P ; to wit, P θ0 = P0 ∈ [0, 1] and P
θ
t = Π
θ
t (P
θ
t−1) for all t ∈ N. If Π
satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ, then Πθ satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence
{θtδt}t∈N0 since
Et
[
Πθt+1 (p)
]
− p = θtEt[Πt+1 (p)− p] ≥ θtδtp(1− p) (2.4)
for all p ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ N0. Furthermore, if Π satisfies BERHR and inft∈N0{θt} > 0, Π
θ satisfies BERHR
as well. Hence, as before, we can define P θ∞ := limt↑∞ P
θ
t for Π
θ. Compared to the updating rule Π with
corresponding performance measure P , the updating rule Πθ yields a performance measure P θ that moves
in the same direction as P , but a smaller magnitude.
We are now ready to state the first result of this paper:
Theorem 2.1. Suppose the updating rule Π satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δt}t∈N0 ,∑∞
t=0 δ
2
t = ∞, and P0 > 0. Then, for all ε > 0, the sequence θ = {θt}t∈N0 with θt := (1 ∧ δt) · c ∈ (0, 1),
where c is a constant depending only on P0 and ε, satisfies P(P
θ
∞ = 1) > 1− ε.
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Theorem 2.1 considers updating rules that satisfy WBERHR and whose relative hazard rates either
vanish slowly or do not vanish. It asserts that for any arbitrary lower bound on the probability of
convergence to optimality, there exists a small step-size version of the underlying updating rule such that
this bound holds.
The proof of Theorem 2.1 can be found in Appendix A. It is based on the idea of applying an
increasing, concave, continuous, and bijective function φ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] to the submartingale P such that
φ(P0) > 1 − ε. The new sequence {φ(Pt)}t∈N0 , in general, is not a submartingale. However, WBERHR
yields a positive lower bound on the expected differences Pt+1 −Pt and φ is locally approximately linear.
Applying φ to the small step-size version P θ, which, in each step, only varies in a small neighborhood,
corresponds to applying an almost linear function to a submartingale with a positive lower bound on its
expected change. Hence,
{
φ(P θt )
}
t∈N0
is a submartingale. Given that P θ∞ ∈ {0, 1}, one then obtains the
statement, that is, P(P θ∞ = 1) > 1 − ε. The main ideas of this discussion are contained in the proof of
Lemma A.1.7,8
Sometimes, an updating rule can directly be interpreted as a small step-size version of some fictitious
updating rule. The following result uses this idea:
Theorem 2.2. Consider an {F[0,t]}t∈N0–adapted stochastic process P = {Pt}t∈N0 , taking values in [0, 1],
such that the following three conditions hold:
1. Non-summable Relative Hazard Rates: The sequence P satisfies
Et[Pt+1]− Pt ≥ δtPt(1− Pt)
for some F[0,t]–measurable random variable δt > 0, for all t ∈ N0, with
∑∞
t=0 δt =∞.
2. WBERHR Stretchable: There exist a random variable δ˜ > 0 and a sequence θ = {θt}t∈N0 of almost
surely non-increasing F[0,t]–measurable random variables θt ∈ (0, 1] such that
−Pt ≤
1
θt
(Pt+1 − Pt) ≤ 1− Pt (2.5)
and δt/θt > δ˜ for all t ∈ N0.
3. Relatively Fast Shrinking: The stopping time ρ, defined as
ρ := min {t ∈ N0 : Pt ≥ yθt} with min ∅ :=∞, (2.6)
7 In Lemma A.1, however, instead of constructing a new submartingale {φ(Pt)}t∈N0 , we are constructing a supermartingale,
using the same ideas. This modified approach simplifies the arguments for Theorem 2.1 and the assertions below.
8Taking a different point of view, small step-size updating leads to a higher probability of converging to 1 due to the lack
of additivity of standard deviation. With small step-size, one step is replaced by several steps. While the expected values of
these steps are additive, the standard deviations add up only subadditively; thus the standard deviation–to–expected value
ratio decreases; and hence, the probability of convergence to 1 increases.
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is almost surely finite for all y ∈ R.
Then, limt↑∞ Pt = 1.
The first two conditions of Theorem 2.2, Non-summable Relative Hazard Rates andWBERHR Stretch-
able, seem natural given our previous analysis since they provide an interpretation of P as a small
step-size version of the performance measure of an updating rule that satisfies WBERHR. In particular,
WBERHR Stretchable requires that if at each time t, the sequence change were (1/θt)(Pt+1−Pt) instead
of (Pt+1 − Pt), then the resulting value of Pt+1 would still lie in [0, 1]; and such an artificial sequence
would satisfy WBERHR with strictly positive expected relative hazard rate (bounded by δt/θt, i.e., the
original bound times 1/θt). The third condition, Relatively Fast Shrinking, requires that the fictitious
compressing sequence θ tends to zero faster than P . Section ?? of the online appendix illustrates that
the Roth-Erev learning model, for example, satisfies all these conditions.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is similar to the one of Theorem 2.1 and can be found in Appendix A as
well. Recalling the informal discussion of the proof of Theorem 2.1 above, we now compress, in each
period, a fictitious sequence, which allows us to increase the concavity (and thus the value of φ(Pt)) in
each step, without losing the submartingale property of the process {φ(Pt)}t∈N0 . At some point in time,
this submartingale is greater than 1 − ε, for any arbitrarily given ε. This event occurs in finite time
due to the assumption of Relatively Fast Shrinking. From this point on, the proof follows the one of
Theorem 2.1.
A limitation of Theorem 2.1 is that it does not provide sufficient conditions for convergence to opti-
mality almost surely and that, for any small step-size version of the updating rule, one cannot pin down
the probability of this event, unless the probability measure P is known. In applications, however, P is
typically assumed to be unknown. These issues are taken care of by Corollary 2.1, where we consider a
reciprocally linearly decreasing compressing sequence:
Corollary 2.1. Suppose the updating rule Π satisfies BERHR and P0 > 0. Then the compressing sequence
θ = {θt}t∈N0 , defined by θt = 1/(t + 2), satisfies P(P
θ
∞ = 1) = 1.
Proof. We check that the sequence P θ of the statement satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 2.2. By (2.4)
and the fact that
∑∞
t=0 θt = ∞, we obtain that P
θ satisfies the Non-summable Relative Hazard Rates
property. The WBERHR Stretchable property follows from the definition of P θ. Finally, Lemma A.3 in
Appendix A yields the Relatively Fast Shrinking property of P θ.
The reciprocally linearly decreasing compressing sequence θ in Corollary 2.1 typically appears in
stochastic approximation theory. Appendix A contains a discussion on the connections of this paper’s
results to related findings based on arguments from that literature.
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2.4 Extended framework
The stochastic processes studied in economics (and other sciences) are often multivariate. For instance,
in models of individual learning, these processes correspond to vectors of probabilities of choosing each
action. In order to embed such models in this paper’s framework, we introduce the configuration space
S, i.e., a convex subset of RD, where D ∈ N. The elements of S are called configurations. In the setup of
individual learning, D is the number of actions, S is the simplex of dimension D− 1, and a configuration
is a vector of probabilities of choosing each action.
Next, we map any configuration to a value in [0, 1], measuring its “performance.” We call this mapping
the aggregator A : S→ [0, 1] and assume that A is a weighted sum of the components of the configuration.
For instance, we map the vector of probabilities of choosing each action into the probability of choosing
an optimal action.
With a slight misuse of notation, we redefine an updating rule as a sequence Π = {Πt}t∈N of functions
Πt : Ω × S → S such that Πt(·, σ) is F[0,t]–measurable for all t ∈ N and σ ∈ S. A pair (Π,A) of an
updating rule and an aggregator is called a system. The performance measure P = {Pt}t∈N0 is now
iteratively defined as Pt = A (σt), with σt+1 = Πt+1(σt) for all t ∈ N0 and σ0 ∈ S exogenously given.
The definitions of the properties WBERHR and BERHR generalize from updating rules to systems
replacing (2.1) of Definition 2.1 with
Et[A(Πt+1 (σ))]− A (σ) ≥ δt · A (σ) (1− A (σ))
for all σ ∈ S, and t ∈ N0. The definition of small step-size versions of updating rules is adapted to this
generalization, formally replacing p by σ in (2.3). We say that the system (Πθ,A) is a small step-size
version of the system (Π,A) and redefine P θ in an analogous way.
With the corresponding adjustments, all results of Section 2.3 generalize to this extended framework:
Remark 2.1. Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.1 hold, mutatis mutandis, replacing the updating rule Π with
the system (Π,A) and the initial performance measure P0 with A(σ0). Theorem 2.2 holds as it is.
3 Application to learning models
We provide several applications of our results in the online appendix. In a first application, we consider
models of individual learning with partial information. That is, we consider an individual who every
period chooses one action out of a finite set according to a probability distribution and observes a payoff
realization of her choice. Upon observing this realization, she adjusts the probability of choosing each
action according to a function mapping (potentially all) past realizations of her choices and obtained
payoffs to the revised probability of choosing each action. In such a setup Bo¨rgers et al. (2004) identify
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conditions on these mappings such that, in every period, the conditional expected value of the change in the
probability of choosing expected-payoff maximizing actions is positive. The conditions they identify yield
learning models that satisfy the BERHR property. Their analysis, however, focuses on the change in the
probability of choosing each action from one period to the next and hence, is silent about the asymptotic
properties of these models. Instead, by explicitly extending their framework to an infinite horizon, we
show that such learning models converge to payoff maximizing actions: (i) with high probability, when
they exhibit small step-size (applying Theorem 2.1) and (ii) almost surely, when they exhibit linear
shrinking step-size such as, for instance, one of the learning models considered in Sarin and Vahid (2004)
(applying Corollary 2.1). We also provide a similar construction in a setting where individuals receive
full information, i.e., observe both obtained and forgone payoffs. For details, see Section ?? in the online
appendix.
In a second application, we analyze models of social learning. We now consider a population of
individuals who, in every period, choose one action within a finite set. Individuals adjust the probability
of choosing each action upon observing their own payoff and also the actions chosen and payoffs obtained
by a random sample of some of the other individuals. Each individual’s revised probability of choosing
each action is a weighted average of its previous probability and an imitation component that only places
probability on the actions that the individual observed, as a function of the payoffs they yielded. The
weight of the imitation component is called the imitation rate. Schlag (1998) considers a version of this
model such that only one other individual’s action and payoff is sampled and the imitation rate is 1, i.e.,
each individual chooses with positive probability only the action she chose or the action chosen by the
individual she observed. He provides conditions on the imitation component that allow the average payoff
of the population, in expected value, to increase in every period.9 For finite populations, however, Schlag
(1998) finds that, with positive probability, all individuals converge to choosing non-optimal actions. By
instead assuming linearly decreasing imitation rates, we can apply Corollary 2.1 to prove that the event
in which the whole population converge to choose optimal actions occurs almost surely.10 For details, see
Section ?? in the online appendix.
In a third application, we consider the Roth-Erev model of individual learning (see Erev and Roth
(1998)). In this model, in every period, each action has an “attraction” corresponding to the accumulated
sum of payoffs that this action has yielded when it has been chosen, and the probability of choosing each
9These conditions require that the difference between the probability that an individual who chose action a switches to
action b and the probability that an individual makes the opposite switch is an increasing linear function of the difference
between the payoffs yielded by b and a.
10In Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) we generalize the conditions in Schlag (1998): if the function describing the net switching
from a to b is strictly increasing in the payoff of b and strictly decreasing in the payoff of a (and satisfies some symmetry
condition), then the fraction of the population who choose first-order stochastically dominant actions is strictly increasing in
expectation and the convergence results of this paper can be applied to that setup as well.
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action is proportional to its attraction. This model has embedded linearly shrinking step-size, therefore
we can use Theorem 2.2 to analyze its asymptotical properties. Beggs (2005) and Hopkins and Posch
(2005) prove that this model converges to payoff maximization using arguments based on stochastic
approximation. In contrast, the proof we provide in the online appendix builds on the properties of the
expected relative hazard rates of this learning model. Hence, our results provide a different interpretation
of the convergence property of this model.11 For details, see Section ?? in the online appendix.
4 Discussion
The analysis of systems that satisfy WBERHR or BERHR can be the starting point for the study of slightly
more complex dynamics. There are many other models in the literature with similar characteristics
to those considered here that do not satisfy these properties. One example is the model of word-of-
mouth social learning in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995). In their model, individuals sample n ∈ N other
individuals out of a continuum population and choose the action that has the highest average payoff
in their observed sample. Aggregate shocks (on top of individual specific shocks) of the payoffs yielded
by the two available actions allow for randomness despite of the population’s cardinality. For n = 1,
their model satisfies BERHR, and hence, their findings are recovered by our results. In particular, the
population may “herd” to the action with the lowest expected payoff with positive probability, and this
probability goes to zero when there is enough inertia (which is equivalent to shrinking step-size in our
analysis). For n > 2, however, their model does not satisfy WBERHR and thus our results tell us nothing
about the asymptotic properties of their model. Future research could study related conditions on these
systems that make it possible to analyze the asymptotic properties of the models in a general framework
encompassing their findings for those cases.
Another possible extension is the study of properties of systems that satisfy (W)BERHR in games.
Beggs (2005) proves that the Roth-Erev learning model leads individuals to converge to play with zero-
probability actions eliminated by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. Tarres and Vandekerkhove
(2012) show that the two-armed bandit algorithm converges to the arm that is optimal in average, even if
its expected payoff is smaller in some periods. Their results suggest that our approach could be extended
to analyze setups in which the set of optimal actions may not be the same in each single period, as it
often is the case in learning in games. This topic deserves further attention in the future.
Lamberton and Pages (2008a,b) provide the rates of convergence for the two-armed bandit algorithm.
Indeed, the trade-off between speed and the probability of achieving convergence to optimality is of
particular interest in the literature of learning automata (see, e.g., Narendra and Thathachar (1989)) and
11Beggs (2005) and Hopkins and Posch (2005) assume that payoffs are bounded away from zero, which is not required in
our proof.
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hence, worth of further study in the setup of this paper.
In our analysis of the properties of the dynamics of choices in social learning models, our sampling
assumptions may seem restrictive in some setups. For instance, observability may rule out network struc-
tures in which individuals may sample some other individuals in the network with zero probability (see,
e.g., Bala and Goyal (1998)). It is intuitive, however, that the choices of individuals who are not sampled
may be observed, after a number of periods, provided that there is a path of individuals connecting the
individual who chose an action and another who could choose that action later via imitation. Analyz-
ing the dynamics of the performance measure in such structures would require developing further the
constructions provided above. This topic is left for future research.
A Proofs of the convergence results in Section 2.3
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of the statements in Section 2.3. Although the models we analyze
resemble a typical setup of stochastic approximation theory in the spirit of Robbins and Monro (1951),
Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1952), Kushner and Clark (1978), and Kushner and Yin (2003), the proofs in this
appendix do not rely on standard techniques developed in that literature. For an excellent overview of
that literature, we refer the reader to Bena¨ım (1999) and the references therein. Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993), Hopkins and Posch (2005), and Bena¨ım and Faure (2012) provide examples where stochastic ap-
proximation techniques have been fruitfully applied to economic learning models. A similar approach
to analyze bandit problems is developed by Lamberton et al. (2004), Lamberton and Pages (2008b), and
Tarres and Vandekerkhove (2012). In the setup of our paper, we found that arguing from first principles
and extending results in Norman (1968) and Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) was tractable for
the generality of our statements.
We start with the core insight for the proofs of the statements in Section 2.3. Here, we strongly rely on
the positivity of the lower bound sequence δ in the definition of the (W)BERHR condition. The following
lemma is inspired by the ideas in Norman (1968) and Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976):
Lemma A.1. If the updating rule Π satisfies (2.1) for some p ∈ [0, 1], t ∈ N0, and F[0,t]–measurable
δt ≥ 0 then
Et
[
e
− γ
θt
Πθt+1(p)
]
≤ e
− γ
θt
p
for all F[0,t]–measurable γ ∈ [0, 1 ∧ δt] and F[0,t]–measurable θt ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. We only need to show the statement for γ > 0. Thus, without loss of generality, assume that the
event {δt > 0} occurs. Define the function Gγ : [0, 1]→ R for all γ ∈ (0, 1 ∧ δt] by
Gγ(z) := z + δtz(1 − z)−
1− e−γz
1− e−γ
, (A.1)
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and observe that Gγ(0) = Gγ(1) = 0 and that
∂2
∂z2
Gγ(z) = −2δt +
γ2
1− e−γ
· e−γz ≤ −2δt +
γ
1− e−γ
· γ ≤ 2(γ − δt) ≤ 0,
since γ/(1 − e−γ) < 2 for all γ ∈ (0, 1 ∧ δt]. This yields Gγ(z) ≥ 0. Similarly, we see that
G˜γ(z) := z −
1− e−γz
1− e−γ
≤ 0 (A.2)
for all z ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1], which yields that
Et
[
1− e−γΠt+1(p)
1− e−γ
]
≥ Et [Πt+1(p)] ≥ Gγ(p) +
1− e−γp
1− e−γ
≥
1− e−γp
1− e−γ
,
for all p ∈ [0, 1], where the first inequality follows from (A.2) with z = Πt+1(p) and the second inequality
follows from (A.1) and (2.1). This yields
Et
[
e
− γ
θt
(Πθt+1(p)−p)
]
= Et
[
e−γ(Πt+1(p)−p)
]
≤ 1,
which proves the statement.
Now, we provide the proof of Theorem 2.1 by applying the previous lemma:
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Fix the smallest integer γ˜ = γ˜(P0, ε) such that e
−γ˜P0 < ε. Define the compressing
sequence {θ}t∈N0 by θt := (δt ∧ 1)/γ˜ ≤ 1, observe that
∑∞
t=0 θtδt = ∞, and define the process M =
{Mt}t∈N0 by Mt := e
−γ˜P θt for all t ∈ N0. We start by observing that M is a supermartingale since, for
fixed t ∈ N0, we have
Et [Mt+1] = Et
[
e−γ˜P
θ
t+1
]
= Et
[
e
−
(δt∧1)
θt
P θt+1
]
≤ e
−
(δt∧1)
θt
P θt =Mt,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A.1. Thus, Mt converges to some random variable M∞ ∈ [0, 1]
and we obtain
P
(
P θ∞ = 1
)
= E[P θ∞] ≥ 1− E[M∞] ≥ 1−M0 ≥ 1− ε,
where we have used (2.4) and Lemma 2.1 in the first equality.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is similar:
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Fix ε ∈ (0, 1) and observe that there exists a constant δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the
event A := {δ˜ ≥ δ} ⊂ {inft∈N0{δt/θt} ≥ δ} satisfies P(A) ≥ 1 − ε/2. Define y := − log(ε/2)/δ > 0 and
the process M = {Mt}t∈N0 by
Mt := e
− δ
θt∧ρ
Pt
1{minu∈{0,...,t}{δu/θu}≥δ}
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for all t ∈ N0, where the stopping time ρ is given in (2.6). As in the proof of Theorem 2.1 we start
by showing that M is a supermartingale. Towards this end, fix some t ∈ N0 and assume, without loss
of generality, that we are on the event {minu∈{0,...,t}{δu/θu} ≥ δ}. Define now P˜t = Pt and P̂t+1 =
P˜t + (Pt+1 − Pt)/θt ∈ [0, 1] and observe that Et[P̂t+1]− P˜t ≥ δP˜t(1− P˜t). We then obtain that
Et [Mt+1] ≤ Et
[
e
− δ
θ(t+1)∧ρ
Pt+1
]
≤ Et
[
e
− δ
θt∧ρ
Pt+1
]
= Et
[
e
−
δθt/θt∧ρ
θt
Pt+1
]
≤ e
− δ
θt∧ρ
Pt
=Mt,
where we have used Lemma A.1, in which we interpret (Pt, Pt+1) as the “compressed version” of (P˜t, P̂t+1).
Thus, as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, Mt converges to some random variable M∞ ∈ [0, 1].
As ρ <∞ almost surely by assumption, we obtain from an argument similar to the one in Lemma 2.1
that
P (P∞ = 1) = E[P∞] ≥ 1− E
[
e
− δ
θρ
P∞
]
≥ 1− E[M∞]− P(A
C) ≥ P(A)− E[Mρ]
≥ P(A)− E
[
e
− δ
θρ
P θρ
]
≥ 1−
ε
2
− e−δy = 1− ε,
similarly to the proof of Theorem 2.1, where AC := Ω \ A. As ε was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain the
statement.
For the proof of Corollary 2.1, we make the following useful observation:
Lemma A.2. For an updating rule Π with corresponding performance sequence {Pt}t∈N0 , we have P
θ
t ≥
P0/(t+ 1) for all t ∈ N0 for the compressing sequence θ defined by θt = 1/(t+ 2).
Proof. Assume that we have shown P θt ≥ P0/(t+ 1) for some fixed t ∈ N0. Then
P θt+1 = P
θ
t +
1
t+ 2
(
Πt+1
(
P θt
)
− P θt
)
≥ P θt −
P θt
t+ 2
=
(t+ 1)P θt
t+ 2
≥
P0
t+ 2
,
and the statement follows by induction.
Simple computations then yield the following core conclusion:
Lemma A.3. Let the updating rule Π satisfy WBERHR with performance sequence {Pt}t∈N0 and P0 > 0
and let θ denote the compressing sequence defined by θt := 1/(t + 2) for all t ∈ N0. Fix y > 0 and define
the stopping time ρ as
ρ := min
{
t ∈ N0 : P
θ
t ≥
y
t+ 2
}
with min ∅ :=∞. (A.3)
Then P(ρ <∞) = 1.
Proof. We shall show the statement with y in (A.3) replaced by NP0, where N = [y/P0] + 1 with [·]
here denoting the largest integer smaller than the argument. Define Nk := N
2k − 1 for all k ∈ N0. Since
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P(ρ > t) is non-increasing in t, it is sufficient to show that P(ρ > Nk) ↓ 0 as k ↑ ∞. This follows if there
exists some constant c ∈ [0, 1) independent of k such that
p1 := P(ρ > Nk+1) ≤ cP(ρ > Nk) =: cp0 (A.4)
for all k ∈ N. Towards this end, Lemma A.2 and the submartingale property of {Pt}t∈N0 yield
P0
N2k
p0 ≤ E[P
θ
Nk
1{ρ>Nk}] ≤ E
[
ENk [P
θ
Nk+1∧ρ
]1{ρ>Nk}
]
= E
[
P θNk+11{ρ>Nk+1}
]
+ E
[
P θρ 1{Nk<ρ≤Nk+1}
]
≤
NP0
N2(k+1) + 1
p1 +
(
NP0
N2k + 1
+
1
N2k + 1
)
(p0 − p1) ≤
P0
N2k
(
p1
N
+
(
N +
1
P0
)
(p0 − p1)
)
since P θt+1 ≤ P
θ
t + θt and p0 ≥ p1. Sorting terms, we have
p1
(
N +
1
P0
−
1
N
)
≤ p0
(
N +
1
P0
− 1
)
and, thus, (A.4).
Lamberton et al. (2004) prove a generalized version of Corollary 2.1 for the special case of the two-
armed bandit algorithm in their Theorem 1(c) and Corollary 2. Their argument can be summarized in
three steps. First, they establish a version of Lemma 2.1 above. Then, via a coupling argument, they
relate the two-armed bandit algorithm to another one where both arms have the same distribution. Third,
they use martingale methods to prove that the later algorithm does not get trapped in zero. Putting the
three steps together they obtain a version of Corollary 2.1 above.
In contrast, the proofs provided here rely deeply on the bounds on the relative hazard rates. In partic-
ular, Lemma A.1 is related to the fact that a concave function of a submartingale is still a submartingale,
as long as the original submartingale only moves in small steps, and is “sufficiently drifted,” which the
BERHR condition guarantees. Lemma A.3, which is used in the proof of Corollary 2.1, can be interpreted
as the statement that the performance sequence does not get trapped in zero, similar to the third step in
Lamberton et al. (2004).
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